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This thesis examines the potential advantages for Finland and Sweden in pursuing 
closer cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible 
membership. The security policy objectives of Finland and Sweden have largely been 
defensive in nature: to ensure national survival and protection of sovereignty. With the 
exception of Finland’s opposition to the Soviet Union’s aggression in 1939–1940 and 
1941–1944 to defend its national independence, both countries have remained neutral in 
foreign and security policies. Sweden’s geopolitical situation is advantageous in that the 
Baltic Sea hinders invasion and the country has positive relations with its immediate 
neighbors. In contrast, Finland shares a lengthy border with Russia and has a complex 
history of relations with Moscow. In 2009, Sweden pledged a Declaration of Solidarity 
that protects its neighboring Nordic states as well as European Union (EU) member states 
in an effort to strengthen and preserve peaceful relations and stability.  
The thesis concludes that the benefits of closer cooperation with the Alliance and 
possible membership, notably collective defense protection under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, are substantial. Russia’s recent aggressive behavior may lead Finland 
and Sweden to seek closer cooperation with NATO and to give greater attention to the 
option of membership. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH...................................................1 
B.  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................1 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................4 
D.  POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .......................4 
E.  RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................7 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE ...............7 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ..........................................................................9 
A.  EARLY FINNISH AND SWEDISH HISTORY THROUGH 
WWII ..........................................................................................................9 
B.  POST WWII: INTO THE COLD WAR ................................................13 
C.  POST-COLD WAR: NORDIC SECURITY AND EU 
MEMBERSHIP ........................................................................................14 
D.  TRANSITION FROM NEUTRALITY TO NON-ALIGNMENT, 
SOLIDARITY, AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ................................17 
III.  POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP OR 
CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR FINLAND 
AND SWEDEN.....................................................................................................21 
A.  PROTECTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
TO INCLUDE ENERGY EXPLORATION AND SEA 
CONTROL ...............................................................................................21 
B.  COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE NORDIC AND BALTIC 
REGION, INCLUDING COUNTERING THREATS TO 
SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION .....................26 
C.  COOPERATION IN DETERRENCE TO PROTECT 
SECURITY INTERESTS .......................................................................32 
D.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................37 
IV.  POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP OR 
CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR FINLAND 
AND SWEDEN.....................................................................................................39 
A.  THE RISK OF NATO MEMBERSHIP ................................................39 
B.  NORDIC ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE WITH RUSSIA ......46 
C.  THE UNCIVILIZED NEIGHBOR ........................................................48 





LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................59 





LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A2/AD  Anti-Access/Area Denial 
BALTOPS Baltic Operations 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and Intelligence 
CBR Chemical Biological Radiological 
CCDCOE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
CDSP Common Security and Defense Policy 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
EC  European Community 
EDA  European Defence Agency 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
EU  European Union 
EU BG European Union Battlegroups 
FCMA Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 
IEA International Energy Agency 
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force 
ISP Internet Service Providers 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
KFOR NATO Kosovo Force 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NORDAC Nordic Armaments Cooperation 
NORDCAPS Nordic Cooperation Armament for Peace Support 
NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PARP  Planning and Review Process 
SEA Swedish Energy Association 
SECGEN NATO Secretary General 
SFNTG Swedish Finnish Naval Task Group 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WEAG West European Armaments Group 
WWII World War Two 
YLE Yleisradio Oy (Finnish Broadcasting Company) 
  
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Above all else, I must give all credit and glory to my Heavenly Father. His many 
blessings in my life instill patience, reassurance, and the desire to perform to the best of 
my abilities. I must acknowledge those closest to me for providing support and 
encouragement every step of the way. My family has always been a source of strength in 
my life. Thank you for constantly uplifting me up in prayer and for imparting words of 
wisdom. I must recognize my girlfriend, Brittney, for her tremendous love, 
encouragement, and unwavering support. Thank you for always speaking words of 
affirmation into my life and for coming alongside me through all the challenges.  
I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the National Security Affairs 
Department and the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School. They provide 
outstanding instruction and guidance to every student at the individual level. There are a 
few faculty and staff members I would especially like to express my appreciation to. I 
would like to acknowledge Captain Charles Good for providing me insightful guidance 
and support during my entire tenure at NPS. As Surface Warfare Chair at NPS, he has 
taken sincere interest in my success in academic studies as well as in my naval career. I 
would also like to recognize Professor Jeff Kline for taking special interest in my thesis 
topic and for providing the opportunity for me to participate in a discussion with 
members of the Swedish Defense University. I would especially like to recognize and 
thank Professor David S. Yost and Professor Wayne Porter for their tireless devotion and 
dedication in advising me through the completion of my master’s thesis. I feel truly 








A. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
This thesis aims to clarify the potential advantages for Finland and Sweden to 
more closely cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and consider 
membership. The security policy objectives of Finland and Sweden have largely been 
defensive in nature: to ensure national survival and protection of sovereignty. With the 
exception of Finland’s opposition to the Soviet Union’s aggression in 1939–1940 and 
1941–1944 to defend its national independence, both countries have remained neutral in 
foreign and security policies. Sweden’s geopolitical situation is advantageous in that the 
Baltic Sea deters invaders and the country has positive relations with its immediate 
neighbors. In contrast, Finland shares a lengthy border with Russia and has a complex 
history of relations with Moscow. In 2009, Sweden pledged a Declaration of Solidarity 
that protects its neighboring Nordic states as well as European Union (EU) member states 
in an effort to strengthen and preserve peaceful relations and stability. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, many prominent 
scholars have published works considering the possibility of NATO membership for 
these two countries. These academic contributions to the subject have been written for the 
most part in Finnish and Swedish, while analyses in English have been more limited. For 
the purpose of this thesis, two works stand out as descriptive and three as analytical in 
providing insight into the motivations behind Finland and Sweden in considering possible 
closer cooperation with NATO or membership in the Alliance. This thesis builds on the 
scholarship on the subject by examining the advantages and disadvantages of possible 
enhanced cooperation or NATO membership as well as bringing the discussion up to 
date. 
As EU members, Finland and Sweden participate in the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Some scholars hold that the Finns’ primary motivation in 
seeking EU membership was security, while Sweden’s motives were believed to be 
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predominantly economic and political.1 In Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of “Neutral” 
Sweden’s Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West, Robert Dalsjö explores 
the historical background of the secret Swedish ties to the Alliance during the Cold War 
that might shed light on the later EU membership agreements. Dalsjö notes the 
significance of the historical steps in Sweden’s relationship with the West to help 
understand policy makers’ cooperative decisions made since 1995.2  
Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta, University of Tamere International 
Relations professor and director of Finnish Journal of International Affairs respectively, 
are the authors of “Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland’s and Sweden’s 
post-neutrality.”3 In this article, they emphasize the commonalities between Finland and 
Sweden as they pursue their relations with NATO and the EU, despite their differences in 
geopolitics and historical memories. The authors’ arguments assess the fluctuations in 
military non-alignment policy as that policy has applied to changes in the EU in relation 
to the external threat posed by Russia. Recent analyses of the subject contrast the context 
of this 2001 article with the demonstrations of Russian aggression in the subsequent 
years. Forsberg and Vaahtoranta forecast that future NATO membership would change 
the non-aligned status of the two Nordic states as well as create for both a larger “security 
constellation” in the North and a long border between Russia and the Alliance. According 
to Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, as Finnish and Swedish politicians form new links with 
NATO, top government leaders will undoubtedly try to sway public opinion in favor of 
membership.4 The works of Dalsjö and Forsberg and Vaahtoranta appear at present to be 
the most useful descriptive works. The discussion of three analytical works follow. 
National Defense University distinguished research fellow Leo Michel published 
a paper in 2011 in a series sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies. This 
                                                 
1 Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland’s 
and Sweden’s Post‐neutrality,” European Security 10, no. 1 (2001): 71.  
2 Robert Dalsjö, Life Time Lost: The Rise and Fall of Neutral Sweden’s Secret Reserve Option of 
Wartime (Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press Sweden, 2006).  
3 Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO.” 
4 Ibid., 72. 
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paper—Finland, Sweden, and NATO: From ‘Virtual’ to Formal Allies?5—is arguably the 
finest recent contribution to the subject of prospective NATO membership for these two 
Nordic countries and the most useful study of this hypothesis. Michel’s analysis 
interprets the strategic transformation of Finland and Sweden from “military non-
aligned” states to cooperative partners with NATO by examining their political and 
defense establishments. In Michel’s perspective, “Given the distance that Finland and 
Sweden already have traveled toward recasting their security policies, transforming their 
militaries, and establishing close ties with the Alliance, membership might seem a logical 
next step.”6  
In his February 2016 article, “Enhanced Defense Cooperation: New Opportunities 
for U.S. Engagement in the Baltic Sea Region,”7 Johan Raeder references Finland’s 
minster of defense Carl Haglund and his Swedish counterpart Peter Hultqvist, who met in 
February 2015 to discuss enhancing bilateral defense cooperation between the two 
countries. Raeder highlights Finland’s and Sweden’s fundamentally new defense and 
security policy, agreed upon in 2015, that rests on the assumption that the challenges in 
the region will be most effectively addressed collectively.8 Also, increased capability 
developments for Finland and Sweden will strengthen their contributions to the “UN, 
OSCE, EU, and NORDEFCO, including to operations under UN, EU, or NATO 
command, as well as to the defense of their own territories.”9 Although not members of 
the Alliance at present, both countries see NATO as the central actor in European 
security and credit a strong and sustainable NATO with an increased capability to uphold 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as a prerequisite for ensuring peace and stability in 
Europe.  
                                                 
5 Leo G. Michel, “Sweden, Finland, and NATO: from ‘Virtual to Formal Allies?,” National Defense 
University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Institute for National Strategy (February 2011), 
http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo11221. 
6 Michel, “Virtual to Formal Allies?,” 18. 
7 Johan Raeder, “Enhanced Defense Cooperation: New Opportunities for U.S. Engagement in the 
Baltic Sea Region,” Atlantic Council (February 2016). Johan Raeder is the former Swedish Defence Policy 
Director and current Defense Advisor at the Swedish Embassy in Washington, DC. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Raeder, “Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” 3. 
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Lastly, David Yost, professor of international relations at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, offers yet another review of European security issues in his book, NATO’s 
Balancing Act.10 His contemporary analysis of the topic dedicates a section to discussing 
the candidacies of Finland and Sweden as possible members of the Alliance. According 
to Yost, “acting in cooperation with the European Union, the NATO Allies helped to 
prevent the emergence of a strategic vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Without PfP 
[Partnership for Peace] and NATO enlargement, the states in this region would have been 
vulnerable to Russian pressures, and they would have probably renationalized their 
defense policies and engaged in local rivalries and power competitions.”11 The 
enlargement of NATO has been a source of security since the Alliance’s beginnings,12 
and Alliance membership might well be beneficial for the prospective Nordic candidates.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the prospects for closer defense cooperation between 
NATO and Finland and Sweden. To this end it examines the following questions: 
 What factors appear likely to shape and influence decision-making 
between NATO and the non-NATO countries Finland and Sweden? 
 If such cooperation appeared advisable to all the parties involved, what 
might it consist of? 
 What types of cooperation would be most productive in deterrence and 
defense in order to protect the security interests of Finland, Sweden, and 
the Alliance? 
 What types of cooperation might be seen as most sensitive in Russian 
eyes? 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
For Finland and Sweden, four aspects of the debate on closer cooperation with the 
Alliance and possible NATO membership are noteworthy. First, the 1995 Study on NATO 
                                                 
10 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2014). 
11 Ibid., 303. 
12 Ibid. 
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Enlargement outlines an elaborate framework within that Alliance detailing the purposes 
and principles of enlargement. Some examples of the purposes of enlargement include: 
“improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area,” “promoting good 
neighbourly relations,” and “common defence and extending its benefits.” Some 
examples of the principles of enlargement include members who “assume all obligations 
of membership,” “strengthen the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion,” and promise to 
“unite their efforts for collective defence and the preservation of peace.”13 The debate in 
the Alliance over Finland’s and Sweden’s prospective candidacies has been minimal due 
to their capacity to meet the Article 10 requirements for member states. These countries 
have already proven their ability to “deepen their cooperation with the Alliance to the 
mutual satisfaction of NATO and the partners”14 in the Partnership for Peace as “mature 
democracies.”15 The main causal factor for Finland and Sweden in seeking membership 
would be the assurance of NATO’s collective defense obligation to protect their security 
interests against Moscow’s growing sphere of influence and possible aggression or 
coercion.16 
Second, Finnish and Swedish analysts have, not surprisingly, made the largest 
contributions to the discussion over enhanced cooperation and possible accession to 
NATO in their native tongues. This causes some limitation in reliance on translated 
documents for research. The assortment of commentary sources should help to provide a 
representative mixture of alternative perspectives on the topic. 
Third, Finnish and Swedish forms of government have fluctuated through many 
different iterations in their long histories—from authoritarian regimes to mature 
democratic governments. In recent history, obtaining EU membership for both countries 
in 1995 has been a milestone in evolving national political identity for Finland and 
Sweden. 
                                                 
13 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” NATO, September 3, 1995, par 43, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_24733.htm. 
14 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 302. 
15 Ibid., 303. 
16 Ibid. 
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Finally, the strategic and political analyses by various political experts have 
deeply contributed to this thesis. Strategic discourse among political leaders has taken 
global events affecting Nordic security into account. This thesis reviews contemporary 
debates in Finland and Sweden concerning improved cooperation with the Alliance and 
possible NATO membership.  
This thesis assesses two plausible hypotheses as answers to the research 
questions. The first hypothesis holds that Finland and Sweden may make the conclusive 
decision to become members of the Alliance. Finnish and Swedish politicians, in a short 
successive timeframe, may justify this decision as necessary to gain security guarantees 
from the Alliance. These same lawmakers would seek national public support for their 
decisions. A decision for membership would require positive arguments from top 
politicians to convince and win the support of the general public. 
The alternative hypothesis suggests that Finland and Sweden may continue their 
long-standing non-aligned status while maintaining their Western tilt, as has been evident 
in their participation in NATO-sponsored military exercises. The prospect of NATO 
membership for these two Nordic states will continue to be fraught, due to Russian 
declarations that such a move would be unacceptable to Moscow. This does not 
completely rule out a future membership in the Alliance; the Partnership for Peace 
activities will probably continue toward an option for membership. As the countries 
progress in that direction, new formulations may be created to describe Finnish and 
Swedish “neutral to non-alignment” policies in their post-neutrality status. As their 
present foreign policies indicate, new terms will surface in strategic decision-making. 
The third logical possibility—Finland or Sweden joining NATO, and the other 
staying out—has been ruled out as improbable, owing to the tacit agreement of the 
governments of these countries to join NATO together or stay out together. According to 
Yost, “Finland and Sweden have nonetheless coordinated many of their activities in 
cooperation with NATO, and some observers speculate that Helsinki and Stockholm 
would act together if they decided to seek NATO membership.”17 
                                                 
17 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 300. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes draws upon historical and political science journals, as well as 
case studies, to characterize opposing perspectives in the NATO membership and 
cooperation debates in Finland and Sweden. Reports by Nordic-based journalists and 
political analysts portray common vantage points as well as conflicting interpretations.  
Each chapter of this study relies heavily on primary and secondary historical 
sources. Many of the details concerning prospective NATO membership may be found in 
various Finnish and Swedish national political archives. Frequently cited primary sources 
include statements made by Nordic political and military leaders, opposing commentaries 
from Russian leaders, excerpts from the Lisbon Treaty (especially Article 42.7), the 
North Atlantic Treaty (especially Articles 5 and 10), and the 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement.18 These primary sources are complemented by credible secondary sources 
analyzing the events and reactions that have shaped new security and political 
perspectives in Finland and Sweden. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II provides historical background on 
Finland and Sweden to supply the reader a frame of reference for Finland’s and Sweden’s 
consideration of closer cooperation with the Alliance or possible NATO membership. This 
chapter covers events prior to EU membership in 1995 and afterward. Chapter III considers 
the potential advantages of NATO membership or closer cooperation with the Alliance for 
Finland and Sweden by examining improved protection of national economic resources, 
collective defense of the Nordic and Baltic Sea region, and cooperative deterrence to 
protect their respective security interests. Following the discussion of the potential 
advantages of NATO membership, Chapter IV discusses the possible disadvantages of 
NATO membership or closer cooperation. This chapter highlights the unmistakable 
negative Russian sentiment toward this process as well as the adverse affects of NATO 
enlargement, including the prospective new obligations of the potential participants. The 
thesis concludes by presenting a summary of the principal findings in Chapter V.  
                                                 
18 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” par. 43. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides historical background on Finland and Sweden in order to 
give the reader a frame of reference for their consideration of closer cooperation with the 
Alliance or possible NATO membership. This chapter cover events both prior to EU 
membership in 1995 and afterwards. 
A. EARLY FINNISH AND SWEDISH HISTORY THROUGH WWII 
Although individualistic in their own respects, Finnish and Swedish national 
security policies have remained comparable throughout the modern era. Examples 
include their cooperative neutral stance during the Cold War and their desire for greater 
EU representation in modern international security. Each country’s political rhetoric is 
echoed by that of its counterpart in regard to defense and foreign policy. Finland and 
Sweden agree on pursuing greater EU involvement in international security, as well as on 
the necessity of collaboration between themselves. Some experts believe that Sweden and 
Finland now have more analogous security policies than they have since 1809 when 
Russia seized control of Finland from Sweden.19 This bilateral relationship is emphasized 
in public statements and other expressions of policy.  
While there are many similarities between Finland and Sweden, some differences 
are noteworthy. Tarja Halonen, then the Finnish Foreign Minister, in 1998 rightly 
described Finland and Sweden as “sisters not twins.”20 Some of the differences between 
Finland and Sweden derive from their dissimilar geopolitics. While Finland shares a 
border with Russia, the Swedes enjoy a buffer zone—that is, Finland. Finnish diplomat 
and journalist Max Jakobson offered the following perspective on the geopolitical 
security situation: “At the higher level Finland and Sweden are closer together than ever 
                                                 
19 Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 69. 
20 Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 69. 
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before but at the deeper level the geopolitical boundary has not vanished. Finland is still a 
border country, Sweden’s buffer towards [the] east.”21  
Based on their proximate geography in relation to their Russian neighbor, Krister 
Wahlbäck has described Finland as the “threatened country” as opposed to the 
“protected” Sweden.22 The Finns are more likely to perceive Russia as a genuine threat 
than are the Swedes. This was made evident in Finland’s two wars with the USSR during 
WWII, whereas Sweden has remained at peace with Russia for over 200 years.23 Finland 
fought in alignment with the Germans in WWII until signing a peace agreement, ensuring 
neutrality, with the Soviet Union in 1944. After WWII, Finland became more aligned 
with the “Scandinavian realm of domestic politics as it caught up in terms of 
industrialization, welfare, and living standards.”24 This resulted in a type of Scandinavian 
balance that would remain the same until the fall of the Soviet Union. Following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Finland and Sweden found themselves obligated to 
reinvent their political ties to Europe.  
Sweden differs from Finland’s far more recent neutrality declaration in 1944 with 
a neutrality policy that has kept Stockholm out of war since 1815.25 Eric Einhorn, among 
other defense strategists, writes of a “Nordic Balance,” in which “Swedish neutrality 
between NATO in the West and the Soviet Bloc in the East guaranteed Finnish neutrality 
and independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and permitted Denmark and Norway to 
pursue a strategy of lowering tensions on the northern flank of NATO by refusing to 
allow foreign troops or nuclear weapons on their territory.”26 This balance continued 
when one of the founding NATO members, Denmark, joined the European Economic 
                                                 
21 Max Jackobson, “Suomen ja Ruotsin suhteet (Helsingin Sanomat, 1998), quoted in Forsberg and 
Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 70. 
22 Krister Wahlbäck, “Uhattu maa ja sen varjeltu naapuri,’ (Helsingin Sanomat, 1999), quoted in 
Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 70. 
23 Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 70. 
24 Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, “Scandinavia: Still the Middle Way?” in Europe Today : National 
Politics, European Integration, and European Security, ed, Ronald Tiersky (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1999), 159.  
25 Einhorn and Logue, “Scandinavia,” 158. 
26 Ibid. 
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Community with 63.3% of their population in favor a referendum in 1973. Since they did 
not want to risk compromising their respective neutrality claims, Finland and Sweden did 
not join the EU until 1995. 
The potential for deeper security cooperation between NATO and these two 
Nordic states is influenced by the contemporary, domestic political attitudes of Finland 
and Sweden coupled with their historical experiences in the 20th century. In 1927, the 
Swedish General Staff presented a defense plan for Sweden in the case of a Russian 
invasion of Finland. This plan would have required the Swedes to take military control of 
the Åland Islands, a Finnish archipelago on the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia in the 
Baltic Sea, to provide military aid to Finland as part of Sweden’s League of Nations-
approved military intervention.27 An updated plan was proposed by the Swedish General 
Staff in 1937 to deploy a majority of the Swedish army to southeastern Finland to defend 
against a Soviet invasion. These two initiatives evolved into the Swedish government’s 
Stockholm Plan of 1939, a proposal in the League of Nations to allow Finland to prepare 
the defense of the demilitarized group of Åland Islands in cooperation with Sweden. This 
plan was withdrawn in May 1939 when the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, 
declared that the Soviets considered the Stockholm plan a threat to their own national 
security.28  
The Stockholm Plan, as a defense of the Åland Islands in case of Russian attack, 
was severely altered by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as well as by Russian demands for 
Finland. Therefore, the Swedish assistance to Finns was limited to approximately 8,000 
Swedish military volunteers and their equipment, instead of a majority of the Swedish 
army as promised by the original Stockholm Plan, during the Winter War of 1939–1940. 
The Swedes represented the most significant foreign military force deployed to Finland to 
oppose the Soviet invasion. In this early part of World War II, Finland’s refusal to 
surrender territory to the Soviet Union provoked a Soviet invasion of the Finnish 
homeland following the Soviet assault on Poland. Finnish researcher Stefan Forss 
                                                 
27 Jacob Westerberg, “The New Dynamics of Nordic Defence Cooperation” in Perspectives on 
European Security: STETE Yearbook 2013, ed. Kati Lepojärvi (Helsinki: STETE, The Finnish Committee 
for European Security , 2014), 61. 
28 Ibid. 
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remarks that the Soviet invasion of Finland “caught the world’s attention. The Soviet 
Union was condemned universally for its blatant aggression and was speedily expelled 
from the League of Nations.”29  
Although heavily outnumbered and poorly equipped, the white-camouflaged 
Finnish ski soldiers resisted the Red Army tanks longer than expected. In fact, the Finnish 
army inflicted much larger losses on Stalin’s Red Army than the Soviet leadership had 
anticipated. The Finns’ stellar military performance caught the Soviets off guard. In most 
surprising fashion, Stalin’s reinforced onslaught against Finland was confounded by the 
Finnish forces. As a result, Stalin settled for peace with the Finns in the spring of 1940. 
The peace treaty in Moscow was a considerable success for Finland, even though the 
Finns lost about 12% of their territory, including the city of Vyborg. Later reports 
indicated that Stalin was aware of French and British deliberation about possible 
intervention on the Finnish side.30 Stalin, having received information that Britain and 
France collaboratively supported Finland against Russia, decided to abstain from 
fighting.31 
When the Nazis attacked Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Swedish Foreign 
Minister Rickard Sandler immediately declared Sweden’s neutrality, forcing Finland and 
Sweden to reshape their defense policies. The foreign minister also indicated that Sweden 
would not adopt the neutrality outlined in international law should a Nordic neighbor be 
attacked. Yet, there were no specifications as to when, or to what extent, this assistance 
would be invoked.32 The Swedish government even indicated that it would reserve the 
right to examine each case individually in the case of intervention, even if that military 
assistance was required in a dangerous security situation on the Finnish mainland.  
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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During the spring of 1940, there was some discussion of a Nordic or Swedish-
Norwegian-Finnish defense union despite the threats being made by Molotov of a Soviet 
war of revenge against Finland. On March 30, 1940 in Stockholm the four Nordic Social-
Democratic party leaders discussed the parties’ possible framework. “Väinö Tanner [the 
Finnish Prime Minister] argued for a union, Norway’s Prime Minister Nygaardsvold 
mostly sat silent, Denmark’s Hedtoft said that his country could not be a party to 
something Germany disapproved of, and [Sweden’s] Per Albin Hansson considered that a 
defence union in practice required such close integration that it must be a matter of a 
union of states, and this would require assurance of support from all four peoples.”33 This 
would be the first and only time the four countries’ governmental leaders formally 
deliberated about Nordic military solidarity. Immediately after the defense union 
discourse, the German occupation of Norway and Denmark caused the Swedes to 
reiterate their previously declared neutrality. 
B. POST WWII: INTO THE COLD WAR 
After WWII, in 1948, the new Swedish Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, presented 
a bold proposal for a Scandinavian defense union. It was considered especially bold 
because Sweden was the only Scandinavian country at the time with the military 
resources to support another union member if attacked. This proposal, most likely 
interpreted by other Nordic countries as being supportive of Swedish national interests, 
failed when the Norwegians chose to be one of NATO’s founding members.34  
Both Finland and Sweden declared neutrality during the Cold War. But it was also 
a period that Tuomas Forsberg has called the “golden era of Nordic cooperation.”35 The 
Nordic Council was established in 1952, a permanent treaty of Nordic cooperation was 
concluded in 1962, and the Nordic Council of Ministers was formed that same year. In 
terms of defense cooperation, the Nordic security option received some attention. Sweden 
and Denmark were in favor of a neutral Nordic defense alliance, whereas Norway was 
                                                 
33 Hugemark, Friends in Need, 39. 
34 Hugemark, Friends in Need, 47. 
35 Tuomas Forsberg, “The Rise of Nordic Defence Cooperation: A Return to Regionalism?,” 
International Affairs 89, no. 5 (September 2013): 1163. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12065.  
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more in favor of the Nordic alliance eventually becoming part of NATO. Since the 
United States refused to supply weapons to this type non-aligned alliance, the 
negotiations ceased, owing to a lack of credibility.36 The idea of defense cooperation was 
strained due to the requirements of Denmark and Norway to uphold their NATO 
obligations while Finland and Sweden maintained their own neutral status. Nevertheless, 
later reports indicate that some observers perceived Sweden as a “secret member of 
NATO” owing to the covert coordination between Swedish defense forces and NATO in 
the early stages of the Cold War. The Finnish armed forces and their intelligence services 
also provided some clandestine support for the Alliance against the Soviet Union.37 
This defense cooperation continued into the Cold War and was termed the 
“Nordic Balance” to describe the regional security arrangements in northern Europe. In 
this balance Norway and Denmark helped define NATO’s restrictive policies in response 
to the Soviet Union’s foreseeable interactions with Finland. It also meant that Sweden 
could use the Soviet Union’s perceived restraint as an excuse for not pursuing 
membership in NATO. However, Finland actively resisted this complex arrangement 
fearing it would fuel a potential Soviet argument for a Soviet military presence in Finland 
in response to Norway and Denmark abandoning their restrictive policies in NATO.38 
While this “Nordic Balance” idea was criticized in some quarters, it helped in the 
promotion of Nordic defense cooperation in the post-Cold War years. 
C. POST-COLD WAR: NORDIC SECURITY AND EU MEMBERSHIP 
In an effort to boost regional security, the Nordic defense ministers held their first 
Nordic Council meeting in August 1997 as a two-day seminar on “Security in the 
Adjacent Areas.”39 This revitalized Nordic cooperation helped policy-makers and experts 
consider regional security issues in the post-Soviet world. Various Nordic developments 
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preceded and paralleled the 1997 Nordic Council meeting, including: the Nordic 
Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC) agreement in 1994 for armament development and 
maintenance, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) in 
1997, and the Nordic Standard Helicopter Project in 1998 to buy and use the same 
helicopter design among the Nordic states. The helicopter project ultimately failed due to 
an inability to agree on the choice between the Italian Agusta EH-101 model and the 
French NH 90.40 A decade later, in 2008, Sweden’s attempts to sell its JAS Gripen 
fighter jets to its Nordic neighbors also failed, due to Norwegian interest in the highly 
advanced, and highly expensive, American, NATO-approved F-35.41  
Besides differences in military partnership in comparison with Denmark and 
Norway, Finland and Sweden varied in their versions of neutrality in the Cold War. 
Sweden was generally viewed as neutral in the West, whereas Finland was deemed 
“Finlandised” by some critics due to the Russian treatment of Finland, which some 
observers compared to the controlling relationship between a marionettist and his 
marionette. Finland’s 1948 treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 
(FCMA) with the Soviet Union created a bond that could not be broken until the USSR’s 
dissolution in 1991.  
European Union membership in 1995 helped bring Finland and Sweden into 
closer parity in many respects. Economic performance in particular saw significant 
growth. Also, Finland’s decision to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
arguably helped propel Finnish progress as a more independent country, in contrast with 
its previous dependence on Sweden for military and economic security.42 The EU 
membership was monumental for both neutral countries as they had now committed 
themselves to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
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As was desired in previous Nordic partnerships, Finland and Sweden finally 
established solid security guarantees. The EU’s northern expansion represented differing 
primary objectives for Finland and Sweden. Finland sought security guarantees while 
political and economic assurances motivated Sweden.43 According to Mauno Koivisto, 
then the Finnish president, “The strongest reason for seeking EC membership seemed to 
me to lie in the realm of security policy. The economic reasons were secondary.”44 The 
Swedish objective in membership was highlighted by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson’s desire for Sweden’s improvement in “political, economic, and social terms.”45 
Indeed, Finland’s and Sweden’s behavior within the EU demonstrates they have 
maintained their respective motives and objectives. 
Security policy has remained a relevant topic in the European Union, especially 
for Finland and Sweden. Both countries have supported cooperation among European 
defense industries. These industries are not seen as threatening the standing security 
policies of Finland and Sweden for non-alignment.46  
While cooperation involving European defense industries is welcomed, the topic 
of collective defense has not been accepted by Finland and Sweden. After her presidential 
inauguration in 2000, Finnish President Tarja Halonen boldly stated, “I do not see a need 
to add a mutual defense obligation to the EU’s functions.”47 The Swedes’ Solidarity 
Clause of 2009 has since changed this perspective by incorporating a form of collective 
defense into Swedish security policy. 
                                                 
43 Ries, Tomas. North Ho!: The New Nordic Security Environment and the European Union’s 
Northern Expansion. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1994, 23. 
44 Koivisto, Mauno. Witness to History: The Memoirs of Mauno Koisvisto President of Finland, 
1982–1994. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997, 246. 
45 Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf, and Rutger Lindahl, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: 
Ambiguity at Work (Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 175.  
46 Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, “Inside the EU, Outside NATO,” 73. 
47 Ibid. 
 17
D. TRANSITION FROM NEUTRALITY TO NON-ALIGNMENT, 
SOLIDARITY, AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE  
In the years since Halonen’s election in 2000, Finland and Sweden have 
maintained their neutral position, while adopting further European integration. Within the 
EU, both countries have become contributors to the Common Security and Defense 
Policy and its EU Battlegroups (EU BG). Both countries have also been active in 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP).48  
The evolution of Swedish defense policy is evident in Sweden’s declaration of 
solidarity coupled with its military non-alignment. The Swedish Minister of Defense, 
Sten Tolgfors, as well as the Foreign Affairs Minister, Carl Bildt, have repeatedly 
emphasized that “Sweden would not stand passive if a neighbour is threatened or 
attacked.”49 Crisis management, international peace, and security still remain top 
priorities in Sweden’s contribution to its international relationships. In the mutual 
dependence clause of their 2004 Defense Bill, the Swedes emphasized their position of 
non-alignment: 
Sweden neither confers nor accepts mutual defence obligations. It must be 
considered improbable, however, that Sweden would find herself quite 
alone if our fundamental security interests were threatened. 
For the foreseeable future a possible negative development in our region 
would reasonably be managed jointly. It is in Swedish interests that the 
European and the Euro-Atlantic structures’ crisis management ability be 
strengthened. There is no contradiction between the development of a joint 
crisis management capability and Sweden’s military non-alignment.50 
Most observers were unfazed to see Sweden’s shift toward closer joint defense 
with its Nordic counterparts. The collapse of the Soviet Union had significantly reduced 
the threat of encroachment from the east. However, Russia’s post-Cold War economic 
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and defense recovery coupled with the radical reduction in Sweden’s own defense forces 
reignited the necessity for the 2004 Defence Bill (as it related to a dominant and 
aggressive Russian military force).51 The Swedish defense structure, similar to that of the 
Finns, is built on the premise of repelling invaders. Resisting the overwhelming military 
force maintained by the Russians would undoubtedly require outside assistance for the 
Swedes and the Finns. In 2005, Swedish Defence Minister Leni Bjorklund emphasized 
the necessity for cohesion, rather than individuality, when fighting this type of potential 
threat. When asked for further clarification for her answer during the 2005 Folk och 
Försvar (People and Defence) national conference, Bjorklund identified the UN as the 
source for that type of collaborative military aid against Russia.52 This statement does not 
seem plausible due to Russia’s position as one of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council.  
Interestingly, Sweden revised its concept of solidarity in the aftermath of 
Bjorklund’s statement. In 2008, the Swedish government announced its Declaration of 
Solidarity to express the extent of Swedish military support. This solidarity was 
expressed in two official documents: the Report of the Defence Commission, and the 
Defence Reform Bill.53 The Report of the Defence Commission, unveiled on 13 June 
2008, declared: 
Sweden will not remain passive should a disaster or an attack afflict 
another [EU] member country or Nordic country. We expect that these 
countries will act in the same manner should Sweden be afflicted. 
This means that Sweden can contribute military support in crisis and 
conflict situations. We must be able and willing to help one another in the 
event of accidents, crises or conflicts, with relevant capabilities. Against 
this background, Sweden shall have the ability both to receive and to 
provide military support.54 
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The Defence Reform Bill of 19 March 2009 announced: 
The government supports the Declaration of Solidarity presented by the 
Defence Committee and covering EU Member States together with 
Norway and Iceland. It is impossible to see military conflicts in our 
immediate surroundings that could affect one country alone. Sweden will 
not remain passive should a disaster or an attack afflict another [EU] 
member country or Nordic country. We expect that these countries will act 
in the same manner should Sweden be afflicted. Sweden should therefore 
be able both to give and to receive military support.55 
This declaration is a significant change in the history and architecture of Swedish 
security policy. Sweden would now be prepared to provide and receive external support 
in times of conflict. The Defence Reform Bill appeared to echo the proposal by Toryard 
Stoltenberg, a veteran Norwegian politician, for collective defense in the Nordic region. 
In the February 2009 Stoltenberg Report he proposed that the Nordic governments 
“should issue a mutual declaration in which they ‘in a binding manner make clear how 
they will react should a Nordic country suffer external attack or undue pressure.’”56  
Hugemark notes that in this version of cooperation in defense one or more 
countries would specialize in “certain tasks with different but complementary roles.”57 
Should Finland and Sweden come under attack, they must be able to rely on each other 
for additional support.58 The brilliance in the Stoltenberg plan, some observers have 
argued, is that it allowed NATO’s safety net over Norway and Denmark to at least partly 
extend eastward over Finland and Sweden as their Nordic allies.59 
The Swedish declaration of solidarity preceded the conclusion of defense 
agreements and security guarantees between the Nordic states and the entire European 
Union. The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into effect in December 2009, provided the 
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greatest defense guarantee for the Nordic countries outside of NATO. Article 42.7 of the 
Lisbon Treaty states: 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for 
those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their 
collective defence and the forum of its implementation.60 
This additional defense guarantee ensures the protection of Finland and Sweden 
as EU member states. Is it enough? Following a 2013 Russian “fly-by” of the Swedish 
coastline, the Swedish defence minister, Karin Enström, recognized Sweden’s reliance on 
EU member states due to the defense guarantees expressed in the Lisbon Treaty. She 
acknowledged the disparity between Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty and Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty but nevertheless stated, “If you really read it, the Lisbon Treaty 
says you must support your EU neighbours with all the necessary means.”61  
This chapter has presented historical background concerning the security policies 
of Finland and Sweden to provide the reader a frame of reference for their consideration 
of closer cooperation with the Alliance or possible NATO membership. It has highlighted 
the most important historical decisions shaping the security and political landscape of 
these Nordic neighbors. The strategically crucial decision by Finland and Sweden to 
become EU members in 1995 may have been the catalyst needed to shift from the 
security policy of neutrality to eventual collective defense, as promised by the North 
Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5. Chapter III examines the potential advantages of closer 
cooperation with the Alliance and possible membership. 
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III. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP OR 
CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR 
FINLAND AND SWEDEN 
Chapter III considers the potential advantages of NATO membership or closer 
cooperation with the Alliance for Finland and Sweden by examining prospects for 
improved protection of national economic resources, collective defense of the Nordic and 
Baltic Sea region, and cooperative deterrence to protect their respective security interests.  
A. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE 
ENERGY EXPLORATION AND SEA CONTROL  
The last 20 years have seen an increase in attention to energy-related issues in the 
Nordic region, especially concerning the scarcity of resources. Some scholars have 
referred to the energy security of northern Europe as a “new cold war” based on the 
shortage of these commodities.62 This phrase is well suited to refer to the increased 
competition within the global economy for natural resources, particularly oil. While 
research continues on alternative energy sources, oil is still the most important 
commodity in the industrial global market economy. Two prominent German analysts, 
Eric Follath and Alexander Jung, referred to oil as the “lubricant of the global economy 
in motion.”63 This is especially true in Russia’s foreign and economic policy strategy to 
monopolize oil exportation throughout Europe. As the European Union’s primary gas and 
oil provider, Russia has deliberately “taken advantage of this lack of cohesion to gain 
favorable energy deals and heighten European dependence on Russian supplies.”64 This 
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Russian strategy aims to stifle future gas and oil pipelines within European waterways 
that do not involve Russia.  
Energy policy has to some extent replaced foreign policy for Russia as the focus 
in its relations with Finland and Sweden. Russia has made clear its intention to 
monopolize refineries and pipelines in Eastern Europe as well as in the Baltic States to 
maintain its status as one of the world’s largest gas and oil exporters. Most analysts agree 
that Russia’s pursuit of gas and oil is a means to extort its neighbors and wield political 
pressure. To counter this pressure, some observers argue, Finland and Sweden must 
partner with the EU and NATO to prevent Russian seizure and monopolization of Baltic 
and Nordic gas and oil sites. An expansion of the European Union’s network of energy 
resources and transportation capacity would help diminish Baltic dependence on Russia 
as the chief supplier of gas and oil. Studies show that between 1991 and 2008 Russia cut 
energy transfers to EU or CIS countries over 30 times, not counting 10 separate 
politically motivated instances of suspension of supply to the Baltic States from 2006 to 
2008.65 The looming possibility and consequences of the Kremlin manipulation of oil and 
gas supplies to the region as a political and economic weapon should drive recognition of 
the need to pursue alternate energy options.  
Insufficient domestic resources have caused the Swedes to rely on imported oil, 
gas, and coal for over half the country’s gross consumption of energy.66 Traditionally, 
Swedish crude oil imports have mostly come from Norway and Iran, yet recent reports 
show an increase of energy imports from Denmark and Russia.67 Russia was identified as 
Sweden’s principal supplier of heating oil in 2004. In that year, “Sweden imported 
262,000m3 from Russia, which was a 44% share of the total [heating oil] imports.”68 
According to a 2012 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), “Sweden imported 
18.8 Mt [million tonnes] of crude oil, or an average of roughly 380 kb/d primarily from 
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Russia (50%), Norway (20%), and Denmark (15%).”69 The 2012 report also noted that 
Sweden is “fully dependent on imports to meet domestic oil demand.”70 In 2015 the 
Swedish Energy Agency (SEA) reported that Sweden imported 18.8 Mt of crude oil from 
Russia in 2014. This compared with 10 Mt from the North Sea (Denmark, Norway, and 
the United Kingdom).71 This illustrates Sweden’s heavy dependence on Russian 
petroleum supplies and underscores the associated political and economic sensitivities. 
Also, “Russia was Finland’s leading trading partner in terms of exports and imports in 
2009, and Finland relies entirely on Russia for its natural gas supplies.”72 According to 
newer data in 2014, Russia still remains Finland’s largest import partner, representing 
over 83% of Finnish energy commodities. Updated from 2009 data, the 2014 report 
identified Germany as surpassing Russia as the Finns’ largest export partner due to a 
decline in Russian trade.73 Nordic leaders are concerned that if the Russians decided to 
shut off energy exportation, their countries would not be able to sustain themselves. The 
Russians have on multiple occasions (for example, at Latvia’s Ventspils Nafia facility in 
2003 and at Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafia facility in 2006) halted pipeline deliveries to the 
oil-dependent Baltic states.74 Therefore, it is understandable that Finland and Sweden feel 
anxious. If the Nordic states were actually shut off from these Russian energy resources, 
they would probably consider making use of the “mechanisms of the EU gas directive 
that grants support to a single member state for up to eight weeks.”75  
The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline continues to be a controversial 
Russian government project among the Western states, even though it involves a Russian 
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partnership with the Germans. Its first line was completed in November 2011, and the 
second line followed just over a year later. At a staggering distance of 1,222 km from 
Greifswald, Germany, to Vyborg, Russia, it surpassed the 2006 Langeled pipeline from 
Nyhamna, Norway, to Easington, United Kingdom, as the longest sub-sea pipeline by 66 
km.76  
The Nord Stream controversy was partly a result of the connection between the 
NATO Ally Germany and the non-NATO country Russia and its passage through 
Sweden’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial waters. The pipeline has 
potential security implications by creating the justification of a Russian military presence 
in the region to maintain safety and prevent sabotage or disruption of the pipeline 
operation. This could lead to political friction between Russia and the Nordic states. The 
controversy is also caused by Russia’s ability to directly transfer gas to Western Europe 
while bypassing gas import-dependent countries such as Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The fear for these countries is that Russia 
could exert political pressure on them due to their high level of dependence on Russian 
oil and gas supplies.77  
Some political actors maintain that the reason for constructing the pipeline 
through the Swedish EEZ rather than via the Lithuanian and Latvian EEZs was based on 
environmental concerns (even though passage through the Baltic EEZs would have 
shortened the distance by 5%).78 The pipeline passes within 68 km northeast of the 
Swedish island of Gotland.79 Although this route is more environmentally safe for the 
Baltic countries, the close proximity to the Swedish-controlled island of Gotland has 
raised concern because it serves as a strategic outpost for the Swedish military as well as 
hosting a fragile ecosystem already damaged by Soviet-era industrial and military waste 
                                                 
76 Larsson, “Nord Stream,” 60. 
77 Stefan Lochner and David Bothe, “From Russia With Gas: An Analysis Of The Nord Stream 
Pipeline’s Impact On The European Gas Transmission System With The TIGER-Model,” Institute of 
Energy Economics at the University of Cologne, no. 07.02.(September 2007): 2. 
78 Larsson, “Nord Stream,” 60. 
79 “Nord Stream FACTS: Facts About the Natural Gas Pipeline Across the Baltic Sea, Issue 3,” Nord 
Stream, Sep 2007: 3, https://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/library/?pk=41. 
 25
dumping. It should be noted that in 2007 the Finns made a request for the Nord Stream 
pipeline to pass through the Estonian EEZ instead of the Finnish EEZ because Estonia 
has a less rocky seabed. The Estonian government rejected this request since it was 
considered “legally contradictive” to previous negotiations.80 Hence, the original plan to 
construct the pipeline through the Gulf of Finland was carried out. 
According to French columnist Laurine Benjebria, Soviet and Russian ships 
dumped radioactive and chemical wastes into the Baltic Sea near Gotland between 1989 
and 1992.81 In Benjebria’s words, “In addition to those radioactive wastes, the Swedish 
maritime space has to face several thousand tons of [Soviet] chemical weapons which 
have been thrown out in the Baltic Sea since 1945. Between 40,000 and 50,000 tons of 
[Soviet] chemical weapons were found in the Baltic Sea. Gotland’s environment is well-
known for its wonderful fauna and flora diversity, and such waste can be dangerous for 
fishing, [a] major source of income of the Swedish Island.”82 The close proximity of the 
Nord Stream gas pipeline to Gotland not only represents an environmental concern for 
the Swedes due to the possibility of spillage; it is also seen as an act of provocation by the 
Russians to increase their military presence inside the Swedish EEZ as they monitor the 
pipeline for “safety concerns.” Sweden and other states, including EU and NATO 
members, have identified the region around Gotland as an area of “vital importance for 
safeguarding operational freedom in the Baltic Sea area.”83 Conversely, the Russians 
view the island as “of equally vital interest since its possession would clearly give the 
Russian excellent ‘flank’ protection should they wish to conduct a military operation in 
the Baltic States.”84 Swedish foreign policy continues to convey a defensive stance on the 
protection of Baltic sovereign waters with the aid of a strong air force and navy. NATO 
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membership has the potential to further improve Sweden’s defense abilities, as well as 
those of its Finnish neighbors. 
It is likely that NATO membership would offer increased protection for Finland’s 
and Sweden’s national economic goals as well as promoting greater interdependence and 
bargaining power among other members of the Alliance concerning natural resources 
from Russia. Finnish and Swedish policy-makers may choose to begin adjusting their 
economic strategies to provide for sources of trade other than Russia in preparation for 
potential NATO membership. Russia’s relations with Finland and Sweden have become 
increasingly frosty following the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia, the 2008 Russian conflict 
with Georgia, and the 2011 completion of the Nord Stream oil pipeline.85 The growing 
fear in Finland and Sweden is that they could find themselves in the same threatening 
predicament that Georgia and Estonia experienced. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014 serves as the latest example of Russian aggression demonstrating the need 
for Finland and Sweden to consider seeking membership in the Alliance. Membership in 
NATO would probably help to subdue these uncertainties.  
B. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE NORDIC AND BALTIC REGION, 
INCLUDING COUNTERING THREATS TO SOVEREIGNTY AND 
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Sweden was eager to take a 
more active role as a leader in Baltic security and decision-making. This was evident in 
the 1996 creation of the Baltic Sea Council, a group of 12 representatives from Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, 
and the EU, ensuring political, economic, and social protection and assistance to the three 
Baltic countries.86  
Sweden has maintained its philosophy of “neutrality,” but it shifted its national 
rhetoric to “non-alignment” in the early 1990s. This terminology was intended to allow 
Sweden and Finland latitude in pursuing various partnerships with other European 
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countries and symbolically was the first active step toward regional collective defense 
following the Cold War. This was made tangible when Sweden and Finland became 
members of the European Union in 1995. The Finnish decision to seek further 
cooperative defense via the EU was described by Bo Hugemark as “an entirely new 
course in Finnish foreign and security policy. During the Cold War foreign-political 
reasons—primarily mistrust of the Soviet Union and literally interpreted policy of 
neutrality—were obstacles to accession; but the dramatic changes of 1989 made it 
possible to raise the question in foreign-policy debate.”87 The decision to join was not 
taken lightly by Finnish politicians due to a 1,300 km border with Russia and an 
extensive geographic separation from fellow EU members with military power in the case 
of conflict. The solidification of partnership through the EU became more binding for 
member states with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.  
This language seems less unequivocal than that in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty; it does not necessarily obligate EU members to provide military assistance when 
under attack, partly due to continued reliance on NATO. Hugemark points out the lack of 
credibility in Article 42.7 as opposed to NATO’s Article 5 for cooperative defense:  
implementation of the security guarantees involved in the EU assistance 
clause is almost impossible to achieve without using NATO resources and 
structures. Of the Union’s 27 members, 21 are members of NATO and 
their countries have unambiguously declared that their defence is entrusted 
to NATO—counted as population this involves 94% of the whole EU 
population.88 
This is disconcerting with respect to the collective defense structure of Finland and 
Sweden, as they are two of the six EU members that are not NATO Allies.  
In 2013, Karin Enström, then the Swedish defense minister, publicly 
acknowledged that the protection under Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty is not 
equivalent to the defense backing of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5. She expressed 
her expectation of EU collective defense following a close encounter off the Swedish 
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coastline by two Russian bombers and four Russian fighters conducting an exercise-
bombing raid against Sweden in March 2013.89 Some analysts argue that the Lisbon 
Treaty is an expression of political solidarity rather than actual military support. In the 
case of a military assault against an EU member, the obligation to render assistance is 
subject only to the amount of military capability each individual government is willing to 
contribute. The unfortunate reality for countries requiring such aid is that the 
interpretation of the obligation is dependent on each individual EU government’s 
assessment of its duties and responsibilities. National decisions determine contributions 
in NATO as well, but the Alliance’s collectively funded capabilities, its long-established 
command structure, its proven combat record in the Balkans and South Asia, and the fact 
it has actually invoked Article 5 (following the 9/11 attacks in America) lend it much 
greater credibility than the EU in collective defense. 
While the EU solidarity clause continues to be scrutinized for its security value, 
Sweden and Finland remain committed to further cooperative alignment. Hugemark notes 
a shift in Finnish sentiment regarding the country’s traditional position of non-aligned 
neutrality in a passage in the 2009 Finnish cabinet’s security policy report: “Membership 
of the Union is a fundamental security policy choice for Finland. As a Member State of 
the Union Finland belongs to a close-knit political grouping, the members of which share 
a strong sense of unity and the will to act in unison. Finland is strongly committed to this 
union.”90 The shift from neutrality to solidarity in the EU in the 1990s might be 
representative of a desire on the part of Finland and Sweden to commit resources toward 
collective defense and security efforts. The commitment to participate in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (both countries joined on May 9, 1994) seems to represent a change 
from the former status of Swedish security policy goals, as outlined by Swedish Prime 
Minister Olof Palme at the 1984 congress of the Swedish Social Democratic party: “the 
defense of our country’s independence, our democratic social order, our right to decide 
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our own future. This responsibility is best served by a firm policy of neutrality.”91 New 
foreign policy choices by Finland and Sweden that align them with organizations for 
conflict prevention, conflict management, arbitration, and deterrence in Europe have 
transformed political, strategic, and military decision making. In 2009 the Swedish 
minister of defense, Sten Tolgfors, reaffirmed national sentiment of solidarity with 
Sweden’s fellow Nordic, Baltic, and EU partners:  
Sweden shares values and interests with the EU and the Nordic and Baltic 
countries. One expression of this is our declaration of solidarity. Sweden 
would not stand passive if a neighbour is threatened or attacked. We 
expect others not to stand passive if Sweden is threatened. We must be 
able to provide and receive support, with relevant capabilities, also of a 
military nature.92 
To aid in bolstering collective defense within the Nordic region, the Swedish and 
Finnish militaries agreed in October 2015 to form a Swedish Finnish Naval Task Group 
(SFNTG). The battle group is intended to be “a cost-effective way for the two nations 
to conduct joint crisis-response operations in the Arctic and the surrounding regions.”93 
The aggressive military behavior of the Russians in recent years has undoubtedly been a 
motivating factor in the formation of the group. Multiple incidents involving Russian 
aircraft and ships in close proximity to the Swedish coastline have also encouraged 
Nordic countries to improve their cooperation in intelligence sharing. When two Russian 
SU-24 fighter jets entered Swedish air space in September 2014, Swedish Foreign 
Minister Carl Bildt declared the event “the most serious aerial incursion by the Russians” 
in almost a decade, according to the Swedish security service Säpo.94 To combat these 
threats, the Finnish and Swedish navies have sought to improve cooperative battlespace 
management, operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 
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capabilities in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) missions. Swedish Defense Minister 
Peter Hultqvist announced that Sweden’s navy is upgrading its fleet in order to be able to 
locate Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea.95  
As a SFNTG and NATO PfP partners, Finland and Sweden share similar 
perspectives on how to deal with contemporary threats. Both countries emphasize 
improved security through multilateral collaboration. Finland and Sweden have 
highlighted the importance of the European Union as a security community and have 
emphasized the significance of solidarity between EU member states to prevent war on 
European soil. Möller and Bjereld highlight the significance of Finland’s and Sweden’s 
cooperation in the following security framework: “European integration, particularly with 
regard to the Baltic States, is considered advantageous in terms of security for Sweden 
and Finland. Both governments underscore the significance of NATO and the importance 
of cooperation with NATO within the framework of the PfP.”96  
The methodology of the SFNTG seems to follow the 2010 “Ghent Initiative” 
intensifying European military cooperation. In this initiative the German and Swedish 
ministers of defense adopted a list of priorities from the European Defense Agency 
(EDA) for pooling and sharing military resources among EU member states. The Council 
of the European Union endorsed the Ghent Initiative in 2010, encouraging all EU states 
to review their national security as well as “capabilities that are essential to national 
security and need to be maintained on the national level exclusively; capabilities that 
could be maintained in closer cooperation with partners without forfeiting authority over 
them (pooling); and capabilities that could be abolished when provided by partners 
instead (sharing).”97 Since 2010, the EDA has taken action to develop guidelines in 
regard to pooling and sharing. This is annotated in the EDA’s November 2010 “Code of 
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Conduct of Pooling and Sharing,” a document endorsed by the European Council for 
cooperation for national defense planning by EU members.  
The European Union’s defensive capacity is reliant on the security infrastructure 
guarantees of the European Defensive Agency (EDA). Leo Michel, a Senior Research 
Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, states that the “CSDP [Common 
Security Defense Policy] likely will have some beneficial effect on Europe’s ability to 
defend itself by facilitating intra-European cooperation on defense capabilities—notably 
through the European Defense Agency (EDA)—and broadening European experience in 
multinational operations.”98 Michel continues, “During the negotiations on the Lisbon 
Treaty, Finland strongly supported provisions aimed at improving EU defense 
capabilities and crisis management mechanisms. However, Finnish officials draw a 
careful distinction between the EU’s modest capabilities to conduct military crisis 
management tasks outside EU territory and the organization’s inability to provide for the 
collective defense of its member states.”99  
As comforting as the EDA and other EU-sponsored military cooperation activities 
appear, skeptics have noted the lack of an EU headquarters to support a collective 
defense mission. According to Michel, “many Finnish experts doubt that the EU would 
be able, in the foreseeable future, to muster the military capability and political will 
necessary to deter or defeat a potential aggressor. Their view remains essentially identical 
to a former Finnish official’s observation in 2005: ‘A separate European defense would 
be possible only if we could be completely certain that it will not be put to test in a real 
situation.’”100 If Finland and Sweden are serious about establishing collective defense 
arrangements for military protection, they might consider the ambitious pursuit of NATO 
membership instead of relying on the EDA or CSDP to fill that security void. 
                                                 




C. COOPERATION IN DETERRENCE TO PROTECT SECURITY 
INTERESTS 
Increased cooperation among NATO Allies has been a catalyst for Finnish and 
Swedish defense building projects to increase local security and efficiency. Shared 
security concerns and limited national economic resources have continued to foster closer 
defense and political cooperation between Finland and Sweden and the Alliance. Yet, 
economic constraints have not deterred the Finns from maintaining a large conscript 
army, despite active debate and evolution in national force structures. The structures 
primarily allocate defense spending toward the protection of Finnish territory and 
resources. Swedish politicians share an interest in protection of the coastline and have 
continued to develop a military posture to support this effort. Finland and Sweden have 
become active participants in NATO-led exercises in recent years. Especially due to the 
Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Alliance 
and its partners have fully recognized the conceivable consequences for a non-member in 
wartime.  
Two of the largest NATO-led exercises that Finland and Sweden participate in are 
Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) exercise. The growing BALTOPS exercise now includes “a whole range of 
military operations—from regular combat to humanitarian aid, stabilization, 
reconstruction.”101 The most recent June 2015 exercise, the 43rd annual BALTOPS, 
involved 17 participant countries (14 NATO allies as well as Finland, Georgia, and 
Sweden) and 5,600 total troops. It showcased anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and 
amphibious landings. Operations involved 49 ships, 61 aircraft, one submarine, and a 
combined amphibious landing force of 700 American, Finnish and Swedish troops.102 
The exercise has traditionally strengthened the participants’ ability to work together as 
they increase regional security.  
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The annual NATO-led Cyber Coalition exercise, now comprising 28 alliance 
members, had its eighth anniversary in 2016. The exercise is intended to encourage a 
cooperative effort in thwarting simultaneous cyber attacks in a challenging cyber 
atmosphere for the Alliance’s members and partners. The NATO website states that the 
exercise’s goal is to “test the rapid sharing of information about cyber incidents. The drill 
also tests the ability of the participating nations to coordinate a defence against a series of 
targeted cyber incidents involving a NATO mission network.”103  
The CCDCOE was established in 2008 following the politically charged Russian 
cyber attack against Estonia in 2007. In this attack 
Web defacements carrying political messages targeted websites of 
political parties, and government and commercial organisations suffered 
from different forms of denial of service or distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks. Among the targets were Estonian governmental agencies 
and services, schools, banks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), as well as 
media channels and private websites.104  
Estonia has since hosted the large assemblage of information technicians, government, 
and legal experts participating in the annual cyber coalition exercise.  
Cyber warfare has gained attention in recent years among government and 
political leaders due its destructive power and its ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
national infrastructures and conventional military technologies, tactics, and procedures. 
Cyber warfare is defined as “an extension of policy by actions taken in cyber space by 
state or non-state actors that either constitute a serious threat to a nation’s security or are 
conducted in response to a perceived threat against a nation’s security.”105  
The term cyber-space conveys is a new operating environment that has caused 
some analysts to recommend revisions to allied force protection. According to Stephen 
Herzog, “In this period of IT-driven globalization, the attacks on Estonia demonstrate that 
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even NATO Article 5 and U.S. nuclear umbrella guarantees cannot ensure the protection 
of a nation-state’s sovereignty in cyberspace.”106 The ability of cyber attacks to skirt hard 
national borders has since motivated NATO members to debate the inclusion of cyber 
warfare into the Article 5 collective defense agreement.  
The 2014 Wales Summit Declaration included the following statement: “Cyber 
attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, 
security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a 
conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task 
of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation 
of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.”107  
Nearly two years later, the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué echoed the 
observations made in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration:  
We agreed in Wales that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of 
collective defence. Now, in Warsaw, we reaffirm NATO’s defensive 
mandate, and recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations in which 
NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at 
sea.108  
Participation in the annual Cyber Coalition exercise is only one example of how 
the Finns and the Swedes are preparing for cyber warfare. The Swedish government has 
been especially interested in conducting littoral operations in the Baltic Sea with multi-
sensor capabilities.  
With the threat of a cyber attack, the Finns and the Swedes have also partnered in 
preparing for possible defense operations against hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare is 
defined by Ohio State University Professor Williamson Murray as “conflict involving a 
combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and 
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terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a 
common political purpose.”109  
According to a published source,  
TMCI [The Military Conflict Institute] decided that conducting its own 
TTXs [table top exercises] during semi-annual general working meetings 
would make a contribution to the analytical community by exploring 
scenarios and decisions not normally addressed in official channels. The 
result is TMCI’s Forbidden Options series of table-top exercises 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Institute for Littoral 
Warfare in Monterey, Calif., each April and at the Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Va., each October.110 
According to the same published source, the exercises consider “potential conflicts in the 
Baltic area.”111  
The SFNTG is designed to combat threats like these. The battle group is intended 
to be “a cost-effective way for the two nations to conduct joint crisis-response operations 
in the Arctic and the surrounding regions.”112 The SFNTG will eventually take advantage 
of the upgraded technology that Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist promised for 
his country’s fleet. Hultqvist told the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, “It’s a general 
fact that Russia is carrying out bigger, more complex, and in some cases more 
provocative and defiant, exercises. We are following that development and are now 
strengthening our military capability and our international cooperation.”113 According to 
Al Arabiya, “In April 2015, Sweden announced plans to raise defense spending by 10.2 
billion kronor (1.09 billion euros, $1.18 billion) for 2016–2020, mostly to modernize 
ships to detect and intercept submarines.”114  
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As has been mentioned, the aggressive Russian military behavior in recent years 
has undoubtedly been a factor in the formation of the group. Multiple incidents involving 
Russian aircraft and shipping in close proximity to the Swedish and Finnish coastlines 
have evidently accelerated growth in Swedish and Finnish naval cooperation and 
intelligence sharing. The exploration of advanced command, control, communications, 
computing, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities such as Mesh networking and localized 
battlespace management have allowed the Swedish and Finnish navies to increase 
situational awareness of a common operational environment and to increase their Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability. This term is widely used in strategic analyses by 
military and defense leaders in Finland and Sweden.  
Membership in the Alliance would increase cooperation in cyberspace, hybrid and 
kinetic area defense, and intelligence sharing for the Finns and the Swedes. The Finnish 
relationship with NATO has led military and political leaders to improve the country’s 
defense forces. Finnish and Swedish policy makers do not, of course, follow NATO 
direction in force levels, personnel, or equipment, but they do recognize the need for 
interoperable communications and operations protocols. The Finns participate in the 
Alliance’s Planning and Review Process (PARP), “the Partnership for Peace counterpart 
to NATO’s process of identifying the military capabilities necessary to meet the level of 
ambition agreed to by the Alliance political leadership and of periodically reviewing each 
Ally’s performance in meeting its agreed-upon force goals.”115 The participation in the 
PARP is a positive trend in improving Finnish defense abilities that increases 
interoperability with NATO forces. Finland’s participation with 10 Allies (plus Sweden) 
in the Strategic Airlift Capability Initiative, deployable Chemical-Biological-Radiological 
(CBR) forces, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, and the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2002 all demonstrate the Finnish 
government’s desire to further improve its force interoperability with NATO.116 Since 
the Finns, as well as the Swedes, have been reliable partners in the Alliance in numerous 
NATO-led coalitions over the last 20 years, it seems reasonable for them to seek 
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membership in the Alliance. Michel concludes, “Given the distance that Finland and 
Sweden already have traveled toward recasting their security policies, transforming their 
militaries, and establishing close ties with the Alliance, membership might seem a logical 
next step.”117 This is a decision that Finnish and Swedish policymakers take into account 
in weighing the political benefits as well as the associated risks and costs.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Swedish and Finnish decisions to become members of NATO would clearly 
strengthen security in the Nordic region as well as the entire NATO alliance. As members 
they would benefit from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: the collective defense 
commitment from fellow NATO members. This is widely regarded as a stronger and 
more reliable source of protection from foreign aggressors than Article 42.7 of the Lisbon 
Treaty on European Union: the solidarity clause. Any political decision to join NATO 
should be supported by the general population as well as by the authoritative political 
actors. If Finnish and Swedish policymakers eventually choose Alliance membership, 
they must understand that their security environment will be profoundly affected by 
NATO’s policies and actions. The prospect of “tandem riders” (Finland and Sweden both 
becoming members at the same time) would likely create a smoother transition into the 
Alliance’s political and military structure as well as encouraging a more cautious Russian 
response.118 The Alliance must be patient regarding the potential inclusion of these 
countries as new members. NATO nations share with Finland and Sweden important 
security and stability interests in Europe. 
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IV. POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP OR CLOSER 
COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN 
Chapter IV discusses the possible disadvantages of NATO membership or closer 
cooperation for Finland and Sweden. This chapter highlights the unmistakable negative 
Russian sentiment toward this prospect as well as what the Russians see as adverse 
effects of NATO enlargement. This chapter analyzes the potential risks for Finland and 
Sweden in reducing economic interdependence with Russia, the cooperative security 
arrangements Finland and Sweden have explored to complement preexisting policies of 
“non-alignment,” as well as the deterrent challenges a revived Russian military may pose 
to Moscow’s neighbors. 
A. THE RISK OF NATO MEMBERSHIP 
The benefits for Finland and Sweden in pursuing NATO membership or closer 
cooperation with the Alliance are not accessible without considering the serious 
associated security risks. The opposition to such an alliance has been made clear in 
declarations from the Russian political elite. One might consider, for example, the 
threatening verbiage used in 2009 by Yuli Kvitsinsky, the vice chairman of the Duma’s 
Committee for International affairs: “Russia could mount a whole range of military, 
political, and economic countermeasures if Finland chose to join NATO...A full NATO 
membership by Finland may lead to a deterioration of bilateral relations…Finland should 
not place this relationship at risk by joining a military alliance.”119 The Finns certainly 
have already demonstrated their ability to act as an independent player in global politics 
and security in the 20th century. Their ability to defend their 1,340 km eastern border, as 
well as to establish a stable relationship with Russia, has prevented conflict or 
annexation. 
It has become increasingly difficult in the post-Cold War era for Finland to 
predict the aggressive actions of its eastern neighbor. For this reason some observers have 
identified the strategic advantages of NATO’s security guarantee to its member states. 
                                                 
119 Yuli Kvitsinsky, interview on Finnish public broadcaster YLE, March 28, 2009, quoted in Yost, 
NATO’s Balancing Act, 297.  
 40
That said, Finland’s policy thus far has been to maintain its autonomous defense 
capability without drawing close enough to NATO to trigger strong Russian responses. In 
his 2007 speech in Washington, Finnish Minister of Defense Jyri Häkämies identified 
“the three main security challenges for Finland today” as “Russia, Russia, and Russia.”120 
His observation stemmed from the ongoing messaging from the Russian elite indicating 
that the Kremlin considers possible Finnish membership in NATO a military threat to 
Moscow.121 Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—are 
cautious about new alliances that could upset the already fragile relations with Russia. 
Holger Mölder’s article on the cooperative security dilemma in the Baltic Sea 
region identifies the area as a “regional security complex”122 within a post-modern 
society. This definition is borrowed from Barry Buzan’s concept of a regional security 
complex consisting of a “group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
[so] that their national securities cannot be considered apart from one another.”123 
Finland and Sweden are lukewarm to the idea of integrating new security and defense 
postures in regional political arrangements. The Russians clearly favor national security 
over any integrated cooperation even if those national security measures conflict with the 
security interests of contiguous regional neighbors such as Finland and Sweden.124 The 
Finns have maintained their policy of “military non-alignment” as a mechanism to protect 
their territorial integrity from Russia, just as they had done during the Cold War to ensure 
border security in relation to the Soviet Union. Finnish and Swedish strategists have 
tailored their national and regional security policies to be in accordance with “non-
alignment” baselines while also exploring new cooperative security options. 
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According to Mölder, the “Nordic security complex” and “Nord-Baltic security 
complex” are favorable to Finland and Sweden, whereas the “Baltic Sea security 
complex” is specifically tailored to Russian interests.125 Mölder defines each regional 
security complex as: 
1. Nordic security complex (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden); 
2. Baltic security complex (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); 
3. Nordic-Baltic security complex (Nordic and Baltic security complexes); 
4. Baltic Sea security complex (includes also Germany, Poland, and 
Russia)126 
This is not to discount the dissimilarities between the Nordic security complex 
and the Baltic security complex, as Mölder defines them. Mölder cites Möller in holding 
that these dissimilarities include differences in “common identities, values, and norms” as 
opposed to a “security community as a value-sharing entity.”127 Möller identifies the 
Baltic security complex as a “security-driven entity aiming to increase the national 
military capabilities of its members and approaching NATO through mutual 
cooperation.”128 This idea has driven security preferences in the Baltic and Nordic 
regions, particularly among the newer NATO member states in the Baltic region—
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as among Nordic NATO members, —Denmark 
and Norway. 
Defense Minister Häkämies’ fears of the Russian threat were made more palpable 
by the Russian actions taken during the war with Georgia in August 2008, less than a 
year after his 2007 Washington speech. A month after Häkämies’ speech Dr. Vladimir 
Kozin, Chief Adviser and Head of the Group of Advisers to the Director, Russian 
Institute for Strategic Studies, gave a seminar at the Finnish Defence University. Forss 
noted that “[Kozin] praised Finnish-Russian relations during the Cold War and suggested 
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a strategic partnership between Finland and Russia, and military cooperation, including 
joint military exercises.”129 In response to Kozin’s seminar, the Russian Ambassador in 
Helsinki immediately distanced himself from Kozin’s viewpoints. Russian Ambassador 
Aleksander Rumjantsev said the views expressed by Kozin were the “personal opinions 
of a researcher” and that they “do not represent the official view of either the Russian 
Federation or the leadership of the Russian Embassy.”130 It was yet another indication of 
the uncertainty and aggressive attitude the Russians could express to Finland and 
Sweden. 
As a former superpower yearning for resurgence, Russia has placed the emphasis 
of its security strategy and policy on being considered a credible and respectable force. 
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and current President of the Brookings Institution, 
Strobe Talbott, commented on the Russian security character following the Russia-
Georgian War of 2008: 
The more authoritarian—not to mention totalitarian—Russia is, the more 
it tends to assert itself in an intimidating or aggressive fashion outside of 
its borders. Another point has always been, … , that Russia has tended to 
define its security…in a zero-sum way. It has tended to feel absolutely 
secure only when everybody else, particularly those around its borders, 
feel absolutely insecure.131 
The troubling threat for smaller countries adjacent to the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War, and at present near the Russian Federation, has been the prospect of 
annexation. Crimea serves as the source of this anxiety. From the viewpoint of Ulrika 
Möller and Ulf Bjereld, the Finns’ decision to reject opportunities for NATO membership 
and to remain neutral during the Cold War was calculated in order to provide diplomatic 
distance from the Soviet Union. “It therefore concerned an aspect of national autonomy 
that is linked to identity; it was an attempt to avoid the experience of being politically 
colonized by the Soviet Union, and it sent a message to the Western sphere that Finland 
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could not be considered an integral part of the Eastern bloc.”132 The Finns’ neutrality and 
diplomatic distance from Russia expired with the USSR’s dissolution, allowing the Finns 
to become more closely associated with Western institutions, including the EU. Still, the 
Finns could not disregard their disadvantage of territorial contiguity with Russia in 
pursuing closer ties with the West as seamlessly as did their Swedish counterparts. Unlike 
the Swedes, the Finns could not substantially cut their defense spending with the 
Russians on their doorstep.133 Ironically, as national defense expenditure continues to 
serve as a top priority for the Finnish military, it might be hypothesized that the Finns 
would now be more open to reaping the benefits of NATO membership than are the 
Swedes.  
Nevertheless, this judgment is inconsistent with recent polls conducted in Finland 
and Sweden. According to a recent Reuters dispatch, “Sweden’s government recently 
said it did not intend to join the alliance, but four opposition parties want membership, 
with polls in the country showing that the population is also split on the matter. In 
Finland, however, a majority opposes the prospect. According to a recent poll by Finnish 
public broadcaster YLE [Finnish Broadcasting Company] only 22 percent of Finns 
support joining NATO, while some 55 percent are against it.”134 Only time will tell if 
Finnish and Swedish poll findings, coupled with official policy statements, shift toward 
supporting membership in the Alliance. 
National autonomy and alliances continue to drive the security decisions of some 
countries in the Nordic region. Möller and Bjereld explain Finland’s decision not to 
pursue stronger military protection through NATO membership as follows: “Finland’s 
military non-alliance is still considered an adequate alternative that upholds both 
territorial integrity and national autonomy toward Russia, especially when combined with 
a credible national defence and a transformed post-neutral European foreign policy.”135 
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Russian political leaders have been especially outspoken in expressing their disapproval 
of NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea region, among other areas. NATO membership 
for Finland would almost certainly worsen the Finns’ already strained relationship with 
Russia. According to Möller and Bjereld, “even in the decades after the Cold War, 
Finland’s military non-aligned position contributes to collective security through a 
balance between the two former blocs.”136  
The Finns’ interest in studying the option of NATO membership has not been a 
secret. The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016 published, “The Effects of 
Finland’s possible NATO membership: an assessment” to clarify the developing security 
environment in the Nordic region.137  
As an unsatisfied power, Russia has made unpredictability a strategic and 
tactical virtue, underpinned by an impressive degree of political and 
military agility. Russia has adopted a revisionist stand towards the norms 
and principles governing the European order. It regards the Atlantic 
Alliance as an adversary and considers any NATO enlargement as a threat 
to its national security. Hence, Russia will attempt to thwart any move by 
Finland or Sweden to join NATO. The historical record of previous 
NATO enlargements, despite the fact that Finland is not viewed by Russia 
in the same light as Ukraine or Georgia, indicate that political and 
economic reactions may be strong, even harsh, notably during the 
transition phase. Even while stopping short of the use of force, specific 
counter-measures would be difficult to predict.138  
According to the Finnish Security Policy 2009 Government Report, Russia is still 
considered “the most important factor in Finland’s security environment.”139 The recent 
Russian military build up has caused some panic in areas of Europe, especially along the 
shared Finnish-Russian 1,340 km border. Some political statements by members of the 
Finnish political elite have differed from their written security policy and strategy. In 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
137 Mats Bergquist, François Heisbourg, René Nyberg, Teija Tiilikainen, “The Effects of Finland’s 
Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment, 2016,” Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (April 2016): 1–
62, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=157408&GUID={71D08E6C-3168-439F-9C31-
0326D1014C26}. 
138 Ibid., 6–7. 
139 “Finnish Security and Defence Policy,” February 2009, www.vnk.fi/julkaisukan-sio/2009/j11-
turvallisuus-j12-sakerhets-j13-finnish/pdf/en.pdf adapted from Michel, “Virtual Allies,” 2. 
 45
April 2010, Finnish Defence Minister Jyri Häkämies dismissed “any actual military threat 
against Finland.”140 The Defence Minister was not alone among Finnish political 
representatives in his intentional vagueness; the Finnish Defense Command had similarly 
asserted in 2008 that “Finland’s defense is not built on any specific enemy or threat.” The 
Command added, “the focal point in developing Finland’s defense is planning how to 
prevent and repel a surprise strategic strike.”141 Any reasonable assessment would 
assume that this Finnish defense document is referring to the heavily advantaged Russian 
military. According to a 2008 Finnish report quoted by Leo Michel, the Russian regional 
quantitative advantage over Finland, even during peacetime, stands out by factors of 
“1.25 for troops, 3.6 for surface ships and submarines, 6.8 for armor, and 7.1 for combat 
aircraft.”142 These numbers cannot go unnoticed by the Finnish government and its 
regional Nordic partners. The romanticized perception of the defense of Finland is 
articulated in The Unknown Soldier, a classic Finnish novel by Väinö Linna later adapted 
into a screenplay: “One Finnish soldier is a match for ten Russkies!” The response is: 
“Fine, all right so what about when the 11th one arrives?”143 This quotation relates to the 
grossly outnumbered Finnish defense forces defending their border from the invading 
Soviet military during the bloody Winter War of 1939–1940. Now, over 70 years later the 
same spirit of confidence and patriotism is echoed among the Finnish populace in regard 
to their potential need for territorial defense against the Russians.144 The Swedes’ 
Solidarity Declaration, as well as multilateral cooperation—promised through 
NORDEFCO and the EU, under article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty—validates these 
defensive assurances. 
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B. NORDIC ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE WITH RUSSIA 
The Finns’ long history with Russia is not only rooted in political and military 
interactions, but is also evident in their economic exchanges. Russia served as Finland’s 
principal trading partner for imports and exports in 2009, including Russian oil and 
natural gas. Dependence on Russian energy resources spurred the Finnish government to 
create a “Russia Action Plan” in 2009. This plan calls for extensive partnerships in trade, 
investment, and transportation with EU members and Nordic and Baltic States, in 
addition to the already smooth collaboration with Russia.145 The objective of this plan is 
for Finland to remove the constraints of lingering Cold War relationships with the 
Russian government.  
The term “Nordic cooperation” or “Nordic-Baltic cooperation” in most foreign 
policy journalism implies collaboration in defense. This term should infer a coalition of 
state economies. Twenty-five years following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the Nordic 
and Baltic states have rapidly become more politically and economically linked. Swedish 
banks have taken an influential role in the economies of the Baltic states. At present, the 
economic linkages appear to be more advanced than the defense relationships among the 
Baltic and Nordic countries.  
In recent years, the Kremlin appears to have been tightening its grip on the 
Finnish economy. Following the Russian state-owned United Shipbuilding Company’s 
purchase in October 2013 of Arctech Helsinki, a shipyard specializing in building 
icebreakers, some Finnish observers voiced concerns about the frightening similarities to 
the harsh economic conditions that the Finns experienced during the massive recession of 
the early 1990s.146 Some Finnish citizens have become wary of the increasing Russian 
role in the Finnish economy as Russia and Finland increase their interdependence. 
According to a 2013 report from Finnish Customs, “Exports to Russia rose 1 per cent in 
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the first seven months of this year while those to the EU dropped 4 per cent up to the end 
of August.”147  
In 2013, Jyrki Katainen, then the Finnish Prime Minister, appeared to welcome 
the increasing economic ties with Russia: “I wouldn’t say they were tightening their 
grip,” he told the Financial Times at a Nordic Council meeting in Oslo. “We are very 
satisfied if there is more Russian investment into [sic] Finland. We need foreign 
investment into Finland.”148 This statement by serving prime minster on economic 
integration with Russia may not be shared by the Finnish public as a whole.  
In the social domain, the Finnish opinion of Russia contrasts with the 2014 
Transatlantic Trends opinion poll that found 76% of the Swedish population “viewing 
Russia unfavorably.”149 As for Finland, “A poll in the Tampere daily Aamulehti has 
found that 43 percent of Finns regard Russia as a security threat to Finland. That 
represents a big rise on the previous poll in March, when barely a quarter of Finns 
thought their eastern neighbour was a threat.”150 Whether the Finnish population actually 
views Russia unfavorably might stir debate about how negative Russian sentiment 
concerning Finland’s policies may affect the Finnish defense structure. Economic 
interdependence with Russia is reason enough for Finland not to gamble on another 
economic recession. In 2015 YLE reported as follows: “Finnish exports to Russia have 
been declining since 2013, when Russia was still Finland’s largest trading partner. 
Finnish Customs reported Tuesday that exports to the eastern neighbour had fallen 35 
percent in the months up to May this year compared to 2014, reflecting a shrinkage of 
exports in almost every sector.”151  
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The Kremlin’s goal of promoting smooth relations with Finland has become 
increasingly more important since Finland’s accession to the EU. On the Finnish side, the 
government has structured a foreign policy that values deepened coordination with 
Russia rather than allowing relations to degrade. For this reason Finland was strongly 
opposed to the EU’s sanctions on Russia following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. This 
approach is exemplified in the “EU’s Northern Dimension,” a joint policy developed in 
1999 between the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland, renewed in 2006 and heavily 
promoted by Finland, that promotes deeper cooperation between Europe and Russia.152 
Alexander Stubb, then Finnish Minister of European Affairs and Foreign Trade, and a 
supporter of Finland’s accession to NATO,153 would attest to this as he had commented 
in Finland’s 2009 “Russia Action Plan.” Stubb stated in 2014, “It is in Finland’s national 
interest to know Russia as well as possible.”154 In the same way, NATO favors deeper 
cooperation with Russia.  
C. THE UNCIVILIZED NEIGHBOR 
The Russians view Finland as a stable and reliable trade partner. For example, in 
2009, Yuriy Deryabin, the first ambassador of the Russian Federation to Finland, said: 
Of all the countries directly on our borders—both historically and as a 
result of the collapse of the USSR [sic]—this is Russia’s most peaceable 
neighbour. There are no unresolved political problems in our relations, nor 
danger of inter-ethnic conflict. Against the background of both existing 
and potential threats to the security of Russia along the perimeter of her 
borders, the frontier with Finland appears the most stable.155 
Interestingly enough, Deryabin had been one the Soviet Union’s most prominent 
advocates of promoting “Finlandization”—a policy of Finland abstaining from 
participating in Western security and economic coalitions, including NATO—during the 
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Cold War, following his arrival at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in 1966. It was during 
this time that Deryabin took on the pen name of “Yuri Komissarov” to express hard-liner 
instructions to Finland.156 The different sentiment expressed in 2009 indicates that 
Finnish-Russian relations have significantly evolved since the end of the Cold War.  
Some members of the Finnish political sector might argue that Russian has not 
acted as a “civilised neighbour.”157 It is hard to ignore the aggressive posture the Russian 
military has presented to Sweden, Finland’s Nordic partner. As a NATO report indicated 
in February 2016, the simulated bombing run by the Russian Air Force on the eastern 
archipelago of Sweden in 2013 was nuclear in nature. The comment by Jens Stoltenberg, 
former Norwegian Prime Minister and now NATO Secretary General (SECGEN), 
reflected Nordic sentiment regarding the increasing threat of Russian aggression affecting 
the Nordic states: “As part of its comprehensive military rearmament, the extent of 
Russia’s military manoevers and exercises have reached levels not seen since the end of 
the Cold War.”158  
Since the 2013 Russian show of force, multiple provocative actions by the 
Russians in the Baltic followed. In September 2014, two Russian SU-24 jets entered 
Swedish airspace low over the Åland Islands, requiring two Swedish JAS Gripen jets to 
scramble to defend Swedish territorial sovereignty.159 Just a month later, a suspected 
sighting of a Russian submarine just 3 km from Stockholm center triggered local and 
international panic. Phillip Simon, the head of public affairs for the Swedish military, 
indicated that the Swedish armed forces received over 400 reports of submarine sightings 
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in the days following three confirmed sightings off the coast of the capital city at 
Kanholmfjärden and Nämdöfjärden.160  
Russian political leaders continue to challenge the accuracy of the Swedish 
government’s statements. In an exclusive interview in April 2016 with the Swedish 
newspaper agency Dagens Nyheter, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized 
the lack of evidence confirming the presence of Russian submarines in the 2014 incident, 
and even denied the recorded evidence of intercepted transmitter calls from Russian 
aircraft over the Swedish archipelago to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad. The Russian 
foreign minster has downplayed and denied every Russian act of aggression against 
Western coalition members in recent years while also warning Sweden to expect Russian 
military action in response to a Swedish decision to pursue NATO membership.161  
In response to a reporter’s question regarding potential counter-measures Russia 
might take in response to Swedish membership in NATO, Lavrov stated, “If Sweden 
decides to join [NATO], we don’t believe for that matter the Swedes will attack us. But 
since the Swedish military infrastructure in that situation will be subordinate to 
[NATO’s] high command, naturally we will take necessary technical-military measures 
at our northern borders, since on the other side there is a military political block that 
regards Russia as a threat and attempts in every way to hold her back.”162  
Evgeny Serebrennikov of the Russian Upper House Committee for Defense and 
Security echoed Lavrov’s statement by asserting, “We are talking not only about some 
technical measures, we are talking numbers as well. Russia will increase the strength of 
its military forces on the northern and northwestern borders if Sweden becomes a NATO 
member, this also includes the North Sea Fleet.”163 Policy makers in Finland and Sweden 
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may now be giving additional credence to the Russian threats, in the not-so-distant wake 
of the Crimea annexation. 
D. DETERRENCE CHALLENGES ON NATO’S EASTERN FLANK 
The current Swedish government remains committed to the country’s historical 
policy of non-alliance. The Swedes have, however, recently been inclined to explore a 
tougher foreign policy posture to counter Russia’s belligerent military actions as well as 
its provocative political rhetoric. NATO members and partners, especially Finland and 
Sweden, took notice of the 2016 RAND research report concerning the lack of effective 
defense capacity on NATO’s eastern flank. The authors of the RAND study reported that 
the results of their war gaming indicated an inability of the Alliance to properly defend its 
new Baltic members—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—in the case of a Russian invasion. 
In the RAND Corporation’s simulations the lengthiest period it would take Russian 
military forces to seize two of the Baltic capitals, Tallinn and Riga, would be less than 60 
hours.164 From this perspective, the threat of the Russian military seizing these three 
former Soviet republics is conceivable, thanks in part to Russia’s lasting presence in 
Kaliningrad. In contrast, Michael Kofman has offered an analysis of deterrence 
requirements consistent with the Alliance’s July 2016 Warsaw Summit decisions.165 
In 2016, Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias analyzed the current 
challenges that Kaliningrad poses for the Alliance. Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Gap 
separate Poland from the Baltic states.166 Only 40 miles wide, some observers have 
classified the Suwalki Gap as a potential “Achilles heel”167 or “chink in the armor.”168 
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Comparisons have been made to the “Fulda Gap,” the stretch of land deemed most likely 
during the Cold War for the Soviets to have launched a surprise attack with tanks rolling 
into West Germany. Some observers regard the Russian territory of Kaliningrad as 
potentially threatening to Finland and Sweden because it houses over 25,000 Russian 
military personnel as well as Russia’s entire Baltic fleet of at least 50 vessels, including 
submarines.169 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, foreign policy analysts at the Heritage 
Foundation, rightly identify the strategic importance of the Baltic islands at risk due to 
Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast. The presence of the S400 air defense system, with Iskander 
missiles capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, as well as modernized 
runways at Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye air bases in Kaliningrad, make the Baltic 
states, as well as Bornholm Island (Denmark), Gotland Island (Sweden), and the Åland 
Islands (Finland), extremely vulnerable to a Russian attack.170 In order to avoid 
provocation from the Russian military, some observers argue, the Finnish and Swedish 
governments must reinforce their political status of non-alliance and maintain their 
distance from NATO membership or closer cooperation with the Alliance. These 
observers hold that the Finns and the Swedes must not jeopardize their relations with 
their powerful neighbor in order to ensure that the Russians do not seize the islands of 
Åland and Gotland. Russian military exercises simulating the conduct of such a scenario 
have provided grounds for concern in Finland and Sweden.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In an era of increased military capabilities and technological advancements, the 
political narrative of a country must match its actions. Finland and Sweden have chosen 
to repeatedly assert their position of cautious consideration of possible NATO 
membership or closer cooperation with the Alliance. The Kremlin might misinterpret this 
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ambiguous course. The Russian government appears to be intent upon reviving its 
international standing through the show of its improved military force. Threatening 
Russian rhetoric and blatantly provocative military exercises have some Western leaders 
on edge. The Finns and the Swedes cannot expect an exceptional degree of protection 
from the Alliance; their status would be similar to that of other Allies. Some Finns and 
Swedes hold that their closer cooperation with the Alliance should also be pursued 
cautiously and deliberately, recognizing the risk of provoking Russia. Neutrality and non-
alliance strategies have proven useful for Finland and Sweden thus far. Some Finns and 
Swedes maintain that the benefits of revising their strategies would not outweigh the 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This conclusion summarizes the principal findings concerning Finland’s and 
Sweden’s prospects for closer cooperation with the Alliance and possible membership.  
Historical evidence illustrates that, since 1995, Finland and Sweden have explored 
enhanced security and defense cooperation options. Finland’s and Sweden’s decision to 
join the European Union simultaneously was a choice of great strategic significance, 
involving relationships beyond their immediate neighbors. This step demonstrated their 
evolution from long eras of neutrality. Finland and Sweden have devoted more attention 
than in the past to ensuring formal security guarantees in cooperation with Nordic 
partners, even to the point of developing competence in specialized tasks within the 
Nordic states’ respective national capacities.171  
The progression of Finland and Sweden in recent years in their security policies 
as well as in their strengthened military capacities might suggest convergence toward 
membership in the Alliance. One of the potential advantages of NATO membership or 
closer cooperation with the Alliance for Finland and Sweden would be the protection of 
national economic activity. Insufficient domestic resources such as oil, gas, and coal have 
motivated Finland and Sweden to look outside their borders for supplies. Russia has 
historically capitalized on its ability to supply oil and natural gas throughout Europe.  
The Russian Federation has identified its ability to regulate oil and natural gas 
exportation as part of its national foreign and economic policy. Russia has exploited this 
advantage to abuse and extort its neighbors, including Finland and Sweden, through 
political pressure. Finland and Sweden may choose to seek refuge in the collective 
defense that the Alliance offers. The challenge of preventing Russian exploitation of 
energy resources would remain, however. The Russian Nord Stream pipeline skirts the 
EEZ of Sweden’s island of Gotland as well as its territorial waters. According to Robert 
Larsson’s 2006 report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the pipeline and its 
                                                 
171 Clive Archer, “The Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security: Big Ideas, Small Steps,” Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook (2010): 56–57. 
 56
riser “could be used as sensor platforms and by that serve intelligence purposes and give 
Russia a competitive intelligence edge in the Baltic Sea.”172 This presents a security 
concern. In 2006, Mikael Odenberg, then the Swedish Minister of Defense, confirmed the 
accuracy of Larsson’s report: “The Russians will be able to exploit it [the pipeline] as a 
platform for intelligence collection. This is a problem.”173 With the pipeline passing 
merely 68km from Gotland, the presence of the Russian military to monitor the Russian 
pipeline has the potential to lead to political friction between Sweden and Russia.  
Another concern arises from the Russian military presence in Russia’s 
Kaliningrad territory, which has access to the Baltic Sea. It is not farfetched to assume 
that a potential Russian attack against Finland and Sweden could be staged from 
Kaliningrad. Membership in NATO would provide collective military aid to protect the 
borders of Finland and Sweden. Some observers speculate that Alliance membership 
could, however, antagonize the Russians and lead them to threaten or take violent action 
against Finland and Sweden. The Russians have insinuated as much with their outspoken 
rhetoric on the possibility of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership. 
Hostile Russian actions in nearby conflicts—the 2007 Russian cyber attack 
against Estonia, the 2008 Russian conflict with Georgia, and the 2014 Russian annexation 
of Crimea—have caused Finnish and Swedish leaders to investigate options for collective 
defense. Russian military activities have included simulated nuclear air strikes over 
Swedish territory as well as encroaching Russian submarines in the waters outside 
Stockholm. These exercises and simulations coupled with the belligerent rhetoric from 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other prominent Russians, have stimulated Finnish 
and Swedish political leaders to reassess their respective national security structures. 
When considering Finnish and Swedish security options, some observers have 
highlighted the differences between the Mutual Defense Clause in Article 42.7 of the 
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Lisbon Treaty and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance’s collective 
defense clause. As non-members of NATO, Finland and Sweden are continuously 
reminded of their limited military prospects for aid in the case of a Russian attack on their 
borders. Perhaps Article 42.7 is better suited to serve as an expression of political 
solidarity than an effective defense pledge. 
Especially for the Finns, a potential conflict with Russia is reason enough to 
maintain political and economic interdependence with their eastern neighbor. Finland 
differentiates itself from Sweden in its higher degree of economic interdependence with 
Russia. Various Russian politicians have reiterated the importance of Russia’s close 
relations with Finland. Finnish interdependence with Russia may not necessarily be 
entirely voluntary. With a large footprint in the Finnish market, Russia has the ability to 
shape and undermine the Finnish economy through trade and investment. In order to 
protect their economic security, the Finns are forced into maintaining their neutral, non-
aligned policy toward Russia. While Finnish security documents highlight the country’s 
satisfactory relations with Russia, Finnish politicians are wary of “Finlandization” as a 
carry-over from the Cold War.  
It may be possible for Finland to maintain good relations with Russia as an 
economic partner while pursuing membership in the Alliance. Nevertheless, the 
unpredictability of Russia cannot be ignored. Finland and Sweden must also consider the 
deterrence challenges on NATO’s eastern flank. As a 2016 RAND report suggested, 
NATO’s eastern flank lacks effective defense capability in the Baltic countries.174 The 
vastly improved conventional Russian military now has the ability to seize Baltic state 
capitals in less than 60 hours, owing to the massive mobilization potential showcased in 
Russian snap exercises. Due to the geographic disadvantage provided by Russia’s access 
to the Suwalki Gap, NATO forces would find it difficult to prevent a Russian invasion of 
the Baltic countries. Finnish and Swedish observers might consider the possibility of a 
similar scenario involving a highly complex and overwhelming Russian military presence 
on the borders of Finland and on the shores of the Baltic Sea. Finnish and Swedish policy 
                                                 
174 Shlapak and Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank.” 
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makers must assess the likelihood and implications of such a scenario and consider the 
benefits and ramifications of potential membership in the Alliance in the case of a 
Russian invasion. 
This thesis has underscored the potential advantages and disadvantages for 
Finland and Sweden in seeking NATO membership or closer cooperation with the 
Alliance. Helsinki and Stockholm are likely to make a decision only after considerable 
deliberation. One policy recommendation for Finland and Sweden, if they eventually 
decide to seek membership in the Alliance, is to become members simultaneously and 
collaboratively. Without a joint decision for NATO membership, Finland or Sweden 
could become geopolitically isolated and exposed.  
The political, military, and social ties between Finland and Sweden are likely to 
remain intertwined in their respective national security policies. Practical cooperation 
between Finland and Sweden, recently exemplified in the establishment of the Swedish 
Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) as one of the battlegroups set up in the context of 
the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), could serve as a 
model for Finnish and Swedish political and military leaders to pursue cooperative 
defense with the Alliance. While this thesis has presented both sides of the strategic 
arguments for Finland and Sweden to potentially seek membership in the Alliance or 
closer cooperation with NATO, further research, as well as a domestic consensus among 
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